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Abstract
This paper presents an estimation of the cost of reducing CO2
emissions as agreed in Kyoto by Annex I countries. Unlike most of
the existing literature, this paper  focuses on European Union
countries abatement costs and, using a simple model, estimates the
role of each EU country within a EU market as well as an Annex 1
market. As a major result, marginal (and total) abatement costs for
each EU country (as well as the EU total cost)  are presented.
Some conclusions on the redistribution of income among market
participants related to the trading system are  also shown.
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21. Introduction
Annex 1 countries signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. These
countries agreed to reach a fixed level of greenhouse gas emissions
by 2008-2012 (see Table 1).  Most countries accepted a substantial
emission reduction, some an emission stabilisation. Few countries
are allowed to increase their emissions up to the agreed quantity.
The emission reduction is clearly expected to involve costs, at
least for some countries: reducing emissions requires either the
implementation of appropriate technological changes in energy
consumption or the reduction of the energy consumption itself; in
any case, reducing emissions involves a social and economic price
to be paid.
The Kyoto Protocol allows for the use of flexibility
mechanisms, whereby countries mitigate their compliance costs.
This work focuses on emission trading. Different scenarios
corresponding to the participants in the market (EU (European
Union), Annex 1 without the FSU (Former Soviet Union), Annex
1 with the FSU) and the limitations in using emission trading are
presented. For each scenario the market price of one ton of
carbon as well as the total abatement cost each country has to pay
is obtained. While the Kyoto Protocol considers six different
greenhouse gases this paper is limited to the most relevant
emission i.e. CO2 (Carbon dioxide).
The economic literature has discussed and presented the issue
of determining abatement costs implied by the Protocol, with and
without emission trading and the other flexibility mechanisms.
Some of this literature is examined in section 2. However, in
existing literature either EU is treated as a single entity within an
Annex 1 market or, as in the isolated case of Bader (2000), EU
countries are considered separately, but the market is limited to
Europe. The aim of this paper is to consider each European
country as a different subject within the EU market but also within
an Annex 1 market. Section 3 and 4 present the methodology
adopted and other major numerical results.
32. The market for emission permits
The Kyoto-related cost for a single country is obtained
considering two different scenarios and their difference in terms of
cost. The first scenario is the Business as Usual (BAU) forecasted
emission level which represents a zero-cost scenario. On the other
hand, an alternative scenario is required with a target in terms of
forecasted emissions. In this context total abatement means the
difference between BAU emissions and Kyoto requirement
emissions and the year 2010, which is central to the period
considered in the protocol, is used as a reference year.
The cost of emission reduction is described by the marginal
abatement cost (MAC). Using MAC curves, demand and supply of
emission permits can be derived. In principle, in order to minimise
costs, each country’s reduction will be such that the MAC
corresponding to that reduction will be equal to the price of the
permits. If the reduction so obtained is higher than the
requirement, the country will sell permits, contributing to the
supply in the permits market. Conversely, if the reduction is lower
than that required, the country will contribute to the demand of
permits (see figure 1). The market-clearing condition determines
the market price of emission permits.
3. Review of the literature
Different authors have discussed  the issue of determining
MAC curves using various strategies and the main solutions that
have been proposed can be briefly outlined. Results vary widely
depending on the methodology. However, most of the papers use
MAC curves derived from detailed technological  (bottom up
model) or macroeconomic models.
Ellerman and Decaux (2000) analyse the impact of permit
trading using estimated MAC curves. derived for each macroregion
(EU, USA, Japan, other OECD countries, Former Soviet Union
Countries and Eastern Europe) by means of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology ’s Emission Predictions and Policy
Analysis EPPA model.
4Figure 1: At price P, country A will reduce by RA, whereas country
B by RB. Since the commitment of country A is lower than RA (the
price PA is lower than P), Country A will be a supplier of permits.
Vicevesa Country B will demand permit. The market involving A
and B will be in equilibrium for a price P such that  (RA-CA)+ (RB-
CB)=0.
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EPPA is a multiregional general equilibrium model of
economic activity, energy consumption  and carbon emissions.
MAC curves are drawn by plotting together shadow prices of
carbon and corresponding percentages of carbon reduction.
Ellerman and Decaux also provide a quadratic interpolation of the
curves in order to obtain the total cost by integration; and to
perform, for each MAC curve, a robustness test to MAC changes
in other regions. Empirical results show that a trade permit system
within the OECD countries should produce a total saving (with
respect to the autarkic solution) of US$13 billion, and a carbon
market price of 240 $/tC. In this context the European Union (as
a whole) and Japan would buy permits, while USA and other
OECD countries would  sell them. A trade permits system within
all Annex 1 countries determines a lower market price (127 $/tC),
and a total cost reduction of about 47% always with respect to the
autarkic solution; in this system only the FSU countries are permit
5sellers but, if trading of “hot air”1 is not permitted, the price will
rise to 150 $/tC, cost reduction is about 40% and permit sellers are
FSU and Eastern Europe countries. Ellerman and Decaux also
provide a simulation of the effects of a 1/3 ceiling on permit
demand; in order words only 1/3 of the potential demand from
each country can be satisfied using the trading system. This ceiling
would lower the price of a ton of carbon to US$114  with a
substantial gain reduction especially for Japan and selling countries.
Edmonds and Scott (1999) show the magnitude of savings that
may accrue from international emission trading. Their paper does
not focus on the Kyoto Protocol but evaluates the costs of
stabilising emissions at the 1990 level by 2010.  MAC curves are
derived from a Second Generation Model (SGM) that links a
detailed technological model of the energy sector with a
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) economic model. As
usual estimated MACs vary widely among the countries involved:
Japan (304 $/tC), Canada (249 $/tC), Western Europe (154 $/tC),
Australia (147 $/tC), USA (139 $/tC) and FSU (0 $/tC). Total
costs amount to US$57,7 billion but drop to US$37,5 billion when
a trading system is considered (equilibrium price is 106 $/tC).
Finally Bader (2000) tries to evaluate the cost of the Kyoto
protocol for EU countries with and without a trading system.
Bader adopts a methodology that does not require any complex
CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) model. In his approach
MAC curves are derived from a carbon demand curve and this
methodology relies on the assumption that it is easier to abate
emissions for countries that have higher price elasticity of Carbon
Demand. MAC curves are derived using a cross country approach
and this is a major limitation of Bader analysis since estimated
parameters are not stable over time and applying the same
                                                
1 In all BAU scenarios, the FSU is assumed to reach an emissions level lower
than that of 1990 by 2010. The difference between projected emissions and the
1990 level is the amount of the so called “hot air”. The fall in emissions level is
a consequence of two factors: the slow growth of the economy and the
reduction of energy subsidies.
6methodology to data from different years gives very different
results. However,  Bader estimates, which use 1995 data, yield
interesting results: the introduction of a tradable permit system
would reduce total cost of compliance with  the Kyoto protocol
for EU countries by about 50%, with Belgium, France, Ireland and
the Netherlands selling permits at a market price of 82 $/tC.
The Energy Information Administration (EIA, 1999) provides
a comparison of costs of the Kyoto Protocol  for the United States
and the cost reduction by Annex I trading, as estimated by using
several CGE models. It provides a useful comparison of our
results with other estimates of USA MACs and the market price of
permits. Estimates of MAC for USA are between US$221 and
US$348 $ per ton of carbon while market price of permits is
estimated to be between 100 and 177 $/tC for Annex I countries.
The OECD report Economic modelling of climate change,
shows the results obtained with different models and is  useful to
compare different studies on the implementation of the Kyoto
protocol. Two of the models used in the articles are predominantly
bottom-up technological models, whereas other models are top-
down economic models. The authors analyse the cost of
implementing the Kyoto Protocol with autarkic measures and with
a system of tradable permits. The ranking of MACs for OECD
countries is relatively uniform in all the papers with Japan at the
top, followed by Europe and then by the United States. The two
bottom-up technological models (MERGE and POLES) provide
different MACs for the United States, US$274 and US$82,
respectively. The remaining models (SGM, G-Cubed, GTEM,
WorldScan, Green, AIM), which are all top-down economic
models, show a large variance (?) in the results, ranging from $38
to $375 for the US, $78 to $773 for Europe and $77 to $751 for
Japan. Model results demonstrate that permit trading, through its
mechanism of equalising MACs across countries, leads to
significant declines in the overall cost of abatement among the
OECD countries. The range of permit prices is $20 (WorldScan)
to $123 (GTEM). Results obtained by the two bottom up models
show a significant coincidence ($112 for POLES and $114 for
7MERGE), top-down models give, in general, lower permit prices,
but  significant variation among the results.
Most of the models show that, since the FSU has the lower
MAC, this region will be the main supplier of permits. In 2010
every OECD region will be a net buyer of permits. Results also
indicate that the size of the market will vary from model to model
and that, in general, the United States would meet (?) a lower
percentage of its emissions from trading than would Japan and the
European Union.
Finally, the importance of the hot air issue is underlined by all
the models. The existence of a hot air bubble would affect the
overall cost and efficiency of emission reduction with a higher
level of emissions for Annex I countries under a tradable emission
scheme than under an autarkic system.
4. Estimating abatement costs
For all countries other than those of the FSU, the approach of
this paper follows Bader (2000). First, a carbon demand function is
estimated for each country. Since neither the market (trade) nor
the price of Carbon are clear, it is essential to preliminarily estimate
quantities and price of this virtual market. The way these quantities
are obtained is explained in the appendix. In short: carbon demand
is a function of carbon price calculated as the ratio of the total
expenditure of carbon fuels and their total carbon content. The
time series of carbon prices shown in figure 2. The difference
between prices in different countries is due both to different prices
of specific fuels and to the different composition of fuel demand.
Thus it should be noted that these series are not genuine collected
time series but estimates and so they contribute to the uncertainty
of the results. The extent to which these data are reliable is
examined in the appendix: the key issue is the percentage of
emissions covered by the fuel considered in determining the price.
The estimated carbon demand function has the form
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where EN is the share of Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES)
covered by carbon-free energy sources; tC  the Carbon emission;
tGDP  the gross domestic product and tp  the price of Carbon ( cP
in the appendix). Since our aim is to estimate the demand for
carbon as a function of price and, when appropriate, of other
variables.
For each country the following regression has been estimated
( ) )log(loglog tt
t
t ENp
GDP
C
gba ++=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
(2)
including or excluding as appropriate EN in order to avoid
multicollinearity with prices or the inclusion of a non relevant
variable. The estimates are obtained either by Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) or by Johansen or Engle-Granger cointegration
procedure, according to stationarity and order of integration of the
series. In some cases,  a reduced sample has been used, in
particular when on the whole sample a non linear relation could be
detected. Details on estimates can be found in Table 2.
Since the aim of this paper is to investigate the cost of carbon
abatement we simply ignore those countries for which the
coverage of emissions is not satisfactory such as Luxembourg.
Moreover, we excluded from the analysis those countries for
which carbon turns out to be a Giffen good (Portugal, Greece and
New Zealand, see figure 7) since the positive relationship between
price and quantity of carbon would lead to negative abatement
costs. 2
                                                
2 A possible explanation for the positive slope of these demand curves could be
the fast industrialisation of  the countries mentioned above during the period
analysed. In such a phase of transition, the share of Industry production on
GDP became bigger, and Carbon consumption has grown quickly because
Industry production requires more Carbon emission per unit of GDP than
agriculture production does.
9The main problems in estimating regression functions were the
non linearity of the relationship and the non stationarity of
dependent variables and regressors. We could eliminate some of
the non-linearity problems simply by reducing the sample used for
some countries or by introducing dummy variables. In fact, by
examining the graphs of price and emissions, we observed that
non linearity was due to a sudden change in the behaviour of the
two series, usually related to a change in the behaviour of
Log(EN). In those cases we allow only for the more recent
structure, dropping the first years or estimating different regression
parameters for the different periods (technically this was achieved
by introducing a dummy) and keeping those estimates with those
from the more recent years. Non stationarity of dependent
variables and covariates must be allowed for in almost all
regressions (see Table 2 where the results of stationarity tests are
summed up). Two different situations must be distinguished
according to the characteristics of the dependent variable: I(0) or
I(1). If the dependent variable is I(1), given that the price series is
always I(1), a cointegrating equation between at least Log(C) and
Log(PC) must be found. Johansen or Engle and Granger
procedures were used and Log(EN) was added as a regressor
whenever possible: it must be I(1), non multicollinear and, of
course, significant. If the dependent variable is I(0) the estimation
is straightforward, the theory states that OLS estimates are
superconsistent and so the usual procedure can be used. Again,
suitable regressors are chosen. Residuals of regression or
cointegrating equations have been used to assess the accuracy of
the models. In particular, stationarity of residuals has been checked
by Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests and autocorrelation
functions have been examined.
Furthermore, in order to evaluate the stability of the estimated
parameters of OLS regressions, two tests have been performed:
the Cumulated Sum of residuals (CUSUM) test and the CUSUM
of Squares test. Some countries (Italy, Belgium and Finland) show
positive results in both tests. Other countries (Germany, Denmark
and Ireland), give positive responses to the CUSUM test, but fail
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the Square of CUSUM test at a 5%  significance (but they do not
fail at 10%  significance). In some cases (United Kingdom, Spain,
Sweden), the CUSUM test shows instability of parameters at 5%
significance (but not at 10%) while the CUSUM of Squares test
does not. The results seem to be quite good: none of the
regressions both tests at a confidence level of 5%, so, for each
country, stability of parameters cannot be rejected. In order to
investigate the effects of global emission trading, carbon demand
functions for the most important non EU Annex I countries
(Australia, Canada, Japan, USA) have been evaluated. The results
are reported in Table 3 below. Stability analysis on the estimated
parameters has been performed CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares
test. (non capisco il senso della frase precedente) Results show that
the parameters for the United States and Australia give positive
responses to both tests at 5%  significance, whereas parameters for
Canada give positive responses only at 10%  significance.
Parameters of the estimated demand curves have been used in
order to calculate Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curves.
Marginal abatement cost is defined, for a fixed abatement, as
the price variation needed to obtain a further reduction of one ton
of C. It is the tax which would produce a reduction in carbon
demand by 1 ton. From (2) we obtain
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and so the MAC corresponding to an abatement of r % starting
from the level Co/GDPo and ignoring covariates different from
price3, is given by
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As stated above the abatement is defined with respect to BAU
zero cost level, so C0 and GDP0 are BAU forecasts for 2010. The
                                                
3 Actually they can be considered. In this case the formula for MAC will differ
from (4) and the estimation procedure will also be slightly different.
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integral of the MAC curve in the interval [0,r] is the cost to abate
r% of the emissions.
The MAC curve for the FSU could not be estimated in this
way because price data were missing . To consider the FSU in our
simulation we simply quote the MAC obtained by Ellerman (2000).
We note that BAU forecasted emissions for the FSU are lower
than the commitment by 111 Mton, in a MAC curve this is zero
for an abatement of less than 111 Mton.
5. Emission trading and abatement costs
Estimated MAC curves are shown in figure 3 as a function of
the percentage of abatement. Some important differences (even
within EU countries) should be observed. As expected from
previous literature  Japan and Italy have uniformly higher MAC
curves, whereas the USA and Australia have MAC curves lower
than those of the other developed countries. The MAC curve for
FSU, as already anticipated, is zero for an abatement less than 111
Mton (the hot air effect) and then grows sharply for abatement
above this amount. By comparing these curves we get the cost of
emission reduction and not the cost of Kyoto requirements. These
are compared in Table 1 where MAC and total abatement costs
corresponding to Kyoto compliance are reported. Table 1 shows
that Denmark is by far the Annex 1 country with the highest
marginal Kyoto cost, due to a substantial commitment (almost
29% of BAU forecasts). In contrast France and Belgium show
marginal costs lower than those of the USA, despite uniformly
higher MAC curves, because of their relatively small commitments.
Analogous considerations apply to the total abatement costs as a
percentage of GDP. MAC curves define a supply and a demand
curve of emission permits and so they can be used to determine
the equilibrium price of permits and, consequently, the number  of
permits each country would sell or buy at equilibrium price. This
analysis has been performed under various hypotheses on the
countries that participate in the market and on the limitations of
the market itself.
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Let us consider first a EU market, closed to non-EU countries.
The market price obtained using this hypothesis is US$211 TC,
whereas the total abatement cost is 10 bln$, saving approximately
12 bln$ with respect to the no trading case. Figure 4 illustrates a
comparison of the cost distribution among EU. Denmark’s share
of cost is dramatically reduced (from US$6.7 billion,
corresponding to 31% of total EU expenditure, to US$894 million,
corresponding to 9.4%), in fact, in the unlimited trading case
Denmark buys permits to cover 86% of the commitment. In
contrast, France and Belgium show a negative cost; thanks to their
low MACs and commitments, they are able to obtain a net income
by selling permits. Spain shows negative abatement cost because
its commitment is higher than BAU forecast and can obtain a net
income by selling permits. The limited trading case shows clearly
that an unlimited market in not needed to dramatically reduce
abatement costs of In fact if purchases are limited, for each
country, to 20% of its commitment, the market price will become
US$160 /tC and the total abatement cost 13.8 bln$, less than 5
bln$ more than the unlimited trading case. On the other hand, if
the sales of each country are limited to 20% of its commitment,
then the market price increases to 462 $/tC, but the total
abatement cost is 13,3 bln$, still much lower than the no-trading
case. Of course the earnings of Belgium and France would now be
greatly reduced.
Only in Bader (2000) is there  a similar case, but the
comparison between the results of this paper  and Bader’s is
difficult due to a different methodology: Bader estimates the
parameters of the MAC curve for the whole of Europe, so that the
same shape applies to all EU countries. This means that
differences in the MAC are given only by differences in the
commitments and in the starting value of the ratio C/GDP.
Nevertheless, following a different approach this paper agrees with
Bader’s ranking of countries. Ultimately, the market price
determined by Bader is 81$/tC, much less than our estimation, and
the same can be said of total abatement costs. However the
13
percentage cost reduction due to the market is, according to both
Bader’s and our calculations, around 50%.
Opening the market to non-European countries such as
Australia, USA, Canada and Japan results in a market price of
142.6 $/tC (in the unrestricted market case). This further reduction
is mainly due to the United States, which has a low MAC and so
can cover at low cost 66% of the total abatement and is the main
supplier of permits (57% of the total supply). The other big
suppliers are Australia, which provides 24% of the total supply of
permits, and France (13%). Belgium, Spain and Ireland together
provide less than 6%. All the other countries demand permits. The
US commitment accounts for 72% of the total commitment of the
countries considered. If trading is unlimited the United States will
sell 52 Mton of C, corresponding to approximately 7% of the total
reduction. This lowers the total abatement cost from 81 bln$ to 42
bln$, more than half of which is spent by the USA as can be seen
in figure 5. Other suppliers of permits are Australia, Ireland, Spain,
Belgium and France, that, because of their relatively low
commitment, gain a net income from trading. Japan and Denmark,
being the two countries that benefit most from trading, reduce
their expenses to 20% and 10% of the no-market case. Costs
relative to limited trade scenarios are compared in figure 5
(columns (C) (D) (E)) which illustrates that limitations up to 20%
of the commitments still allow a dramatic reduction in abatement
costs. The highest total cost is incurred with a 20% of purchase
limitation: 60.2 bln$. Finally, we evaluate a market open also to the
FSU, whose commitment is higher than BAU forecasted
emissions. For this reason, the MAC of the FSU is zero for
abatement below the difference between commitment and BAU
emissions. In practice, a supply of 111 Mton is introduced, leading
to an important reduction of costs as can be seen in figure 5: the
FSU earns US$13.1 billion from trading and the USA buy permits.
In figure 6 the results of the Annex 1 permits market with and
without the FSU for each country are illustrated in more detail.
Price estimates for the Annex 1 market are easier to find in
literature, and our results are similar to the values obtained by
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other authors quoted in section 2. Adequate consideration should
be given to the different methodologies used, because some
models consider the European Union as a single area and do not
analyse European countries separately.
6. Conclusions
The empirical part of this paper shows that, without
transaction costs, a market of permits (vive should) help to reduce
the individual and total costs of emission abatement. Clearly, the
higher the ceiling on sales and purchase, the smaller the cost
reduction.
According to economic theory, a trading permit scheme
should help to attain  an efficient allocation, but it should be (?)
completely neutral with respect to any equity consideration. In
fact, a country would be a buyer or a seller of permits depending
on its endowment, that is, on its initial commitments. Since
commitments are basically political agreements, it is useful to
underline that they should be defined carefully: the definition of
commitments may produce a redistribution of income (via tradable
permits) from countries that have adopted mitigation measures to
countries that have not. In fact, probably, the latter can still
implement cheaper measures whereas the former have only
expensive options to reduce emissions. In this sense, Kyoto
commitments seem to lead to a paradox: countries with lower
levels of emissions per GDP and emissions per capita pay
(through the purchase of  permits) developed countries that have
significantly higher levels of emissions per capita and per GDP.
The result of a tradable market system, in fact, is that Japan and
the EU buy permits from the United States if commerce takes
place among OECD countries, or from Russia if commerce is
open to Annex I countries, where the USA and Russia have the
highest ratios of emissions per unit of GDP and per capita (see
table 4).
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Country Japan EU USA Russia
CO2 / GDP 0,45 0,5 0,83 2.09
CO2 / Population 9,29 8,58 20,5 9,89
Tab. 4: Emissions Indicators for some Annex I countries
(1997). Source: IEA.
It should be noted that these indicators can be misleading and
must be broken down on a sectoral level. Indicators are, in fact,
influenced by the productive specialisation of a country and the
structure of the economy affects the levels of emissions. When
sectors that are intrinsically polluting represent a high share of
GDP, aggregate indicators are influenced by their effect even if
sectoral indicators show optimal performance. Moreover, the
geographical aspects of each country must be taken into account.
For instance, countries with low population density will register
high levels of emissions per capita in the transportation sector
because of the distance that workers, goods and raw materials are
forced to travel. Temperature also influences the level of
emissions.
Sectoral indicators confirm the results showed by aggregate
ratios of the countries considered. With the exception of the
Russian transportation sector, per-capita emissions are always
higher in the USA and Russia than in Europe and Japan.
Further lines of research include: a specific study on the role of
the FSU. Its market position suggests that it may act as a
monopolist, and so its aim might not be to minimise costs, as in
this  model. For example, the FSU could wait until the deadline
fixed by the Kyoto Protocol to sell permits at a higher price to
countries at risk of non compliance. It is also true that the FSU
comprises a number of countries and this may mitigate the
monopoly, but there is a reasonable possibility that they may still
act as a group. The absence of transaction costs is a second main
defect of this model and a market with transaction costs would
allow less savings than the no friction market we assumed.
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Appendix: price and quantities of the carbon market.
As discussed in section 3, an index of fuel prices should be
used as the price of Carbon in a virtual carbon market.
Following Bader (2000), carbon price is defined as
å
å
=
i ii
i ii
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P (A1)
depending on the consumption of the different fossil fuels Fi, on
fuel prices Pi and on the carbon content of each fuel (Ci).
Interpreting (A1) as the price of carbon seems reasonable since
this model considers the total expenditure for fuels containing
carbon by the total carbon content  of the fuels themselves.
Carbon contents of fuels are quoted from Bader.
Historical data (1970-1997) for Fi and Pi for each of the EU-15
countries are provided by the International Energy Agency. For
each of the countries involved in the calculation, fuel consumption
and price data are divided into three sectors by end use and a
possible selection of fuels has been considered for each of these.
Price data are always end user prices and contain energy or
CO2 taxes, set at different levels in each country. They are
expressed in terms of US$ PPP in order to even out the
differences in the general price level of EU countries.
 Fuel consumption data by sector were extracted from the IEA
database. The fuel classification by type considered in this database
is less refined than the one used for prices.
In particular, all  gasoline and diesel for motors are grouped in
the household sector, and high-sulphur fuel oil (HSFO) and low-
sulphur fuel oil (LSFO) are grouped in the industrial sector. The
aggregate fuel oil consumption for households has been split into
diesel and gasoline according to the observed ratios of
gasoline/diesel consumption derived from “Energy Statistics of
IEA Countries”. That is, DIESEL consumption is a´(TOTAL
MOTOR FUELS) where a is the share of diesel consumed as
motor gasoline  as well as diesel used in households. GASOLINE
is calculated in the same way.  Furthermore, we equally subdivided
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the figure for aggregate gasoline in LEADPREM, LEADREG;
UNPREM95; UNPREM98 and UNREG.
While quantities in the original databases are in different units
(litres, tons of oil equivalent, cal), all quantities from this model are
expressed in Mtoe. Conversion factors are provided by “CO2
Emissions from Fuel Combustion” edited by the IEA. Prices in
the database are in US$ PPP relative to various units of fuels. The
carbon price we calculated is expressed in US$ PPP per tonne of
Carbon. As mentioned above, PC depends on the prices of fossil
fuels as well as their market shares.
This paper does not consider the total fossil fuel consumption,
but a share (in broad terms, the percentage of fossil fuels for which
corresponding price and quantities are available), and, moreover,
this share varies over time. The fuels considered in the PC
calculation represent a share of total consumption4 of about 60%,
starting from a minimum value of 40% for Luxembourg, to a level
of about 80% for France, Italy, and Denmark. The total coverage
is relatively stable from 1978 to 1997. In fact, in many countries
the quantities recorded in the original database are constant over a
number of years, which is a clear sign of  their reliability. Besides
the share of consumption covered by the fuels, the share of carbon
emissions covered by our selection can be considered. This is the
ratio of carbon emissions by each fuel (expressed as SCiFi) and
total carbon emissions as recorded in “CO2 Emissions from Fuel
Combustion” (2000). The average share of Carbon emissions
covered is about 70%, starting from a minimum coverage of about
40% for Luxembourg, to levels near 80% for France, Denmark,
Belgium and Italy.
If we examine the coverage level of carbon emissions and the
coverage level of consumption for Italy we see again that the level
is quite stable over the past 20 years and also observe that the
coverage level of carbon emissions is uniformly higher. In other
words 75% of the fuel consumed in Italy produces 85% of carbon
                                                
4 As reported in “Energy Statistics for OECD countries”, IEA, 2000.
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emissions, meaning that we tend not to use the less carbon-
intensive fuels.
The lowest consumption coverage levels are registered by
Sweden and France. Both countries have a percentage of TPES
covered by hydro and nuclear close to 46% In both cases a
significant amount of end-use demand is not considered in our
calculation, but its contribution to carbon emissions is near zero.
Analogously, the lowest emission coverage levels are registered
by Germany and Greece. Both countries show 25% to 35% of
TPES covered by brown coal. Figure 2 reports the time series of
Carbon price for EU-15 countries.
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Table 1: Kyoto commitments and costs for Annex 1 countries (autarkic solution).
ABATEMENT
(Emiss. BAU – Commitment) ABATEMENT COSTEMISS.
BAU
(MtC) (MtC)
% tot
EU % tot % BAU
MAC
Billion $
% tot
EU % tot
%o
GDP
A 17,455 2.773 2.5% 0.4% 15.9% 594 724 3% 1% 4.8
B 30.273 986 0.9% 0.1% 3.3% 49 24 0% 0% 0.1
DE 15.818 4.555 4.2% 0.6% 28.8% 4.364 6.721 27% 7% 58.8
FI 20.182 5.509 5.0% 0.7% 27.3% 471 1.040 4% 1% 11.7
FR 107.182 243 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 7 1 0% 0% 0.0
D 265.091 46.587 42.6% 6.0% 17.6% 189 4.043 16% 4% 2.8
SW 26.182 10.456 9.6% 1.3% 39.9% 710 2.517 10% 3% 15.8
IR 9.818 351 0.3% 0.0% 3.6% 20 3.420 14% 4% 5.3
IT 125.727 13.106 12.0% 1.7% 10.4% 609 3.360 13% 4% 3.3
NL 46.091 4.724 4.3% 0.6% 10.2% 653 1.378 6% 2% 4.7
UK 166.636 20.119 18.4% 2.6% 12.1% 197 1.827 7% 2% 1.7
Tot EU 830.455 109.410 - - 13.2% - 25.054 100% 28% 4.46
AUS 105.491 28.025 - 3.6% 26.6% 0.91 4.971 - 6% 0.01
CAN 150.136 40.541 - 5.2% 27.0% 318 5.292 - 6% 9
J 310.309 38.102 - 4.9% 12.3% 1.706 26.811 - 30% 10.3
USA 1,800.464 564.392 - 72.3% 31.3% 117 27.908 - 31% 4.2
Tot 3,196.855 780.470 - - 24.4% - 90.037 - 100% 5.1
A – Austria; B – Belgium; DE – Denmark; FI – Finland; FR – France; D – Germany; SW – Sweden; IR –
Ireland; IT – Italy; NL – the Netherlands; UK – United Kingdom; Aus – Australia; CAN – Canada; J – Japan;
USA – United States.
Figure 2: Price of Carbon for EU countries.
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Figure 3: MAC curves for Annex 1 countries.
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Figure 4: Abatement cost for EU with no trade (A); unrestricted trade (B); trade with purchases
restricted to 20% of commitment (C) and sales restricted to 20% of max sale (D).
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Figure 5: Abatement cost for Annex 1 without FSU assuming: no trade (A); unrestricted trade
(B); trade with sales restricted to 50% of maximum sale (C); sales restricted to 20% of max sale
(D); purchases restricted to 20% of commitment (E). Abatement cost with FSU assuming: no
hot air (F) and hot air (G).
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Figure 6: Abatement costs for scenarios: no trade (A);
unrestricted trade without FSU (B); unrestricted trade with
FSU and hot air (G).
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Figure 7: Scatter plot of carbon “demand” against price for
countries which showed a Giffen good behaviour for Carbon.
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Table 2: Final estimates for EU countries (Johansen tests results: the numbers in parentheses
are the critical values at 5% and 1% levels).
Country Sample Order of Integration of
seriesinvolved and of
residuals (when
applicable to the
method)
Method used in
estimating demand
equation.
Demand equation: final estimate
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Austria (A) 78-97 LP=I(1)  LC=I(1) Johansen
H0=None: 37.7 (29.7; 35.6)
H0= At most 1: 15 (15.4;
20)
LC=-0.08-0.311*LP
         (0.05)
Belgium (B) 78-97 LP=I(1)  LC=I(0)
Residuals=I(0)
(not spurious)
OLS
With dummy variables
LC=1.4*(1-dummyb)*LP-0.4*dummyb*LP +
        (0.2)     (0.04)
+0.9*dummyb- 9.3*(1-dummyb) (0.2)      (1.3)
R-squared=0.89
Denmark (DK) 78-97 LP=I(1)  LC=I(1)
Residuals=I(0)
(not spurious
OLS
With dummy variables
LC=-0.19*LP-0.56*dummydk-0.57
   (0.06)   (1.9)          (0.3)
R-squared=0.51
Finland (FN) 84-97 LP=I(1) LC=I(0)
Residuals=I(0)
(not spurious)
OLS LC=0.609-0.365*LP
  (0.508) (0.084)
R-squared=0.50
France (FR) 78-97 LP=I(1) LC=I(1)
LEN=I(1)
Johansen
H0=None: 44 (29.7; 35.7)
H0= At most 1: 19 ((15.4;
20)
LC=-0.806-0.235*LP-0.435*LEN
         (0.060)   (0.057)
Segue pag. 29
Segue da pag. 28
Germany (D) 78-97 LC=I(1) LP=I(1)
Residuals =I(0)
OLS
ADF on residuals
(Cointegration by Engle and
Granger)
LC=2.19 - 0.614*LP
  (0.287) (0.047)
Johansen: LC=2.55-0.67LP
LR test indicates 4 c.e. at 5% significance
Ireland (IR) 89-97 LC=I(1) LP=I(1)
Residuals =I(0)
OLS
ADF on residuals
(Cointegration by Engle and
Granger)
LC=-0.15*LEN - 0.37*LP
     (0.04)         (0.03)
R-squared=0.80
Italy (IT) 78-97 LP=I(1) LC=I(0)
Residuals=I(0)
(not spurious)
OLS LC=-1.293-0.133*LP
   (0.120) (0.019)
R-squared=0.71
Netherlands
(NL)
78-97 LC=I(1) LP=I(1) Johansen
H0=None: 16.6 (15.4; 20)
H0= At most 1: 2.4 (3.7;
6.6)
LC=-0.489-0.197*LP
         (0.035)
Spain (S) 78-97 LC=I(1) LP=I(1)
Residuals=I(0)
OLS
ADF on residuals
(Cointegration by Engle and
Granger)
LC=-1.30-0.11*LP
      (0.13) (0.02)
Rsquared=0.61
Sweden (SW) 78-97 LC=I(1) LP=I(1)
Residuals=I(0)
OLS
ADF on residuals
(Cointegration by Engle and
Granger)
LC=-0.33*LP
     (0.00)
R-squared=0.69
United Kingdom
(UK)
78-97 LC=I(1) LP=I(1)
Residuals =I(0)
OLS
ADF on residuals
(Cointegration by Engle and
Granger)
LC=0.578-0.390*LP
  (0.261) (0.044)
R-squared=0.80
Table 3: Final estimates for non- EU countries (Johansen tests results: the numbers in
parentheses are the critical values at 5% and 1% levels).
Country Sample Order of
Integration of
series involved and
of residuals (when
applicable to the
method)
Method used in
estimating demand
equation.
Demand equation: final estimate
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Australia
(AUS)
78-97 LP=I(1)  LC=I(1)
LEN=I(1)
Residuals=I(0)
(not spurious)
OLS
dummy variables
LC= -1.50 – 0.07*dummyaus*LP +
        (0.32)  (0.016)
0.10*(1-refaus)*LP – 0.94*(1-refaus) + 0.29*LEN
(0.12)                        (0.64)                     (0.14)
R-squared=0.71
Canada
(CAN)
78-97 LP=I(1)  LC=I(0)
Residuals=I(0)
(not spurious)
OLS LC=0.93 - 0.41 *LP
   (0.16) (0.02)
R-squared=0.91
Japan (J) 78-97 LP=I(1)  LC=I(1)
LEN=I(1)
Johansen
H0=None: 90 (47; 54)
H0= At most 1: 45 (29; 35)
H0= At most 2: 16 (15; 20)
LC=-0.14*LP+1.15
    (0.08)
United States
(USA)
86-97 LP=I(1) LC=I(0)
Residuals=I(0)
(not spurious)
OLS LC=2.14 - 0.69*LP
   (0.68) (0.13)
R-squared=0.73
Dummyaus is a dummy variable that is 0 between 1984 and 1987 and 1 elsewhere.
Table 4 – Domestic abatement and total abatement cost for
Italy in different trading scenarios.
Domestic
abatement (MtC)
TAC
(Billion US$)
Autarkic 13.105 3.359
Unlimited EU 5.452 4.74
Unlimited Annex I 4.154 2.66
Unlimited Annex I with
FSU
3.191 1.53
Table 5 – Market price of permits when ceilings on
purchases and sales are imposed. The limits are expressed as
a percentage of the commitment for purchases, as a
percentage of the sale in unrestricted case for sales.
Purchase Sale
Limits (%) Price
(US$/tC)
TAC
(bil Us$)
Price
(US$/tC)
TAC
(bil US$)
10 - 63.354 535 52.860
20 39 48.507 277 44.574
30 84 41.342 190 40.257
40 89 36.176 146.4 37.215
50 93 32.473 123 35.039
60 96 29.943 118 33.083
70 97 28.339 113 31.235
80 98.9 27.478 108.7 29.503
90 99.9 27.103 104.2 27.940
100 99.9 27.189 99.9 27.189
Table 6 – Market price of permits and total abatement cost
for different choices of market participants.
Price
(US$/tC)
TAC
(billion US$)
EU 218 10(1)
Annex I –FSU 147 42
Annex I + FSU no H.A. 130 40
Annex I +FSU + H.A. 100 27
(1)  only EU countries
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